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Abstract: Biro and Siegel have raised 
two objections against the pragma-
dialectical approach to argumentation. 
According to the first, the pragma-
dialectical theory is not genuinely 
normative. According to the second, 
the rejection of justificationism by 
pragma-dialecticians is unwarranted: 
they reject justificationism unjustly 
and they are not consistent in accept-
ing some arguments (‘justifications’) 
as sound. The first objection is based 
on what we regard as the misconcep-
tion that the goal of resolving differ-
ences of opinion cannot provide a 
normative perspective. In response to 
the second objection we argue that in 
pragma-dialectics, the notion of argu-
ment, and related notions, are defined 
in a non-justificatory manner. 
 
Resumé:  Biro and Siegel have raised 
two objections against the pragma-
dialectical approach to argumentation. 
According to the first, the pragma-
dialectical theory is not genuinely 
normative. According to the second, 
the rejection of justificationism by 
pragma-dialecticians is unwarranted: 
they reject justificationism unjustly 
and they are not consistent in accept-
ing some arguments (‘justifications’) 
as sound. The first objection is based 
on what we regard as the misconcep-
tion that the goal of resolving differ-
ences of opinion cannot provide a 
normative perspective. In response to 
the second objection we argue that in 
pragma-dialectics, the notion of argu-
ment, and related notions, are defined 
in a non-justificatory manner. 
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 1. Introduction: The epistemic challenge 
 
Since theories of argumentation deal with the question what counts 
as reasonable arguments, the choice of a specific philosophical 
reasonableness conception that underlies a theory of argumentation 
is of great importance and it can lead to intractable discussions 
among argumentation theorists. In the last two decades, epistemi-
cally oriented philosophers have voiced their criticisms of dialecti-
cally oriented argumentation theories at regular intervals. Among 
the most persistent are Biro and Siegel (Biro & Siegel: 1992; 
2006b; Siegel & Biro: 2008). In this paper we shall give a reply 
from a pragma-dialectical perspective and show that the objections 
by Biro and Siegel against the dialectical project are based on in-
correct assumptions. 
 Since we do not think that epistemology and dialectics are 
competing perspectives, it is surely not our intention to do away 
with epistemic approaches to argumentation.
1
 On the contrary, we 
take there to be many possibilities to integrate epistemological in-
sights in dialectics and we believe that vice versa epistemology can 
profit from incorporating dialectical insights.
2
 
 Biro and Siegel’s criticism of the pragma-dialectical approach 
to argumentation boils down to two objections. Although these are 
connected, we will discuss them separately. Firstly, they claim that 
the pragma-dialectical model is not genuinely normative for the 
reason that the norms that make up the model do not guarantee 
rational outcomes. Secondly, they claim that the pragma-dialectical 
approach does not and cannot live up to its aspirations derived 







                                                 
1
 Neither do Biro and Siegel, who make it clear that they conceive of their epis-
temic approach and the pragma-dialectical approach as complementary, the 
former dealing with arguments as objects and the latter with the procedural re-
quirements for arguing (2006b: p. 10). 
2
 An example of a dialectical problem that could be solved by means of episte-
mological insights is the problem of specifying the dependency variants of circu-
lar reasoning, in which the acceptability of the premise ‘depends on’ the truth or 
acceptability of the standpoint. And, as Biro and Siegel point out (2006b: p. 9), 
the method of critical discussion might be of help to epistemology by providing 
a method for arriving at justified beliefs or knowledge. Freeman (2005) has 
shown how dialectical and epistemic insights can be integrated in order to evalu-




2. The normativity claim in the pragma-dialectical argumenta-
tion theory 
 
In the pragma-dialectical approach, argumentation is conceived of 
as a verbal contribution with which a speaker or writer, called the 
protagonist, makes an apparent attempt to convince an addressee, 
called the antagonist, of the acceptability of his standpoint, while 
pretending that this apparent attempt at convincing is part of a 
shared endeavor to resolve their difference of opinion on what they 
consider the merits of their respective positions. Central in this 
approach is the notion of a critical discussion, which explicates the 
normative idea of dispute resolution by specifying the various stag-
es in the resolution process and the verbal moves that are instru-
mental in each of these stages. The philosophical background of 
this ideal model of critical discussion is critical rationalism, such as 
promoted by Popper. If one adopts the viewpoint of a critical ra-
tionalist “one pursues the development of a reasonableness model 
that takes the fallibility of human reason explicitly into account, 
and elevates the concept of systematic critical thinking in all areas 
of human thought and action the guiding principle of problem solv-
ing” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1988: p. 279). 
 In a critical discussion, a difference of opinion is “resolved” 
only if the parties have reached agreement on whether or not the 
protagonist’s standpoint is acceptable vis-à-vis this particular an-
tagonist, after having tested the standpoint’s defensibility against 
the antagonist’s doubts and criticisms. The rules for critical discus-
sion are instrumental to this process of putting the standpoint and 
its defense to the test; discussion moves that obstruct this critical 
process are seen as unreasonable and called “fallacious”.  
 One characteristic of the pragma-dialectical approach to argu-
mentation is that arguments are not conceived of as mental pro-
cesses, but as made up from statements that create public commit-
ments. In this respect van Eemeren and Grootendorst follow Pop-
per, who states that only publicly formulated theories are a suitable 
object of a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1982: 
p. 55; Popper 1979: p. 6, 31). As Popper states,  
 
Subjective knowledge [consisting of dispositions and ex-
pectations] is not subject to criticism. Of course it can be 
changed—for example by the elimination (killing) of the 
carrier of the subjective knowledge or disposition. (…) As 
opposed to this, objective knowledge [consisting of lin-
guistically formulated expectations] can change and grow 
by the elimination (killing) of the linguistically formulated 
conjecture: the ‘carrier’ of the knowledge can survive—he 
can, if he is a self-critical person, even eliminate his own 
 conjecture. The difference is that linguistically formulated 
theories can be critically discussed. (1979: p. 66.)  
 
In the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, terms such as 
‘justification’, ‘support’ and ‘argument’ refer to inferences that 
have been made public in statements. When talking about ‘dialec-
tic’, we refer to theories that purport to provide a normative model 
for such verbal, argumentative exchanges. 
 According to the picture sketched by Biro and Siegel, the 
pragma-dialectical argumentation theory is ambivalent between a 
reading that takes the normative dimension seriously, in which case 
the result is “in fact an epistemic [theory]” (2006b: p. 5), and a 
reading that takes the focus on agreement and resolution seriously, 
in which case the result is a theory that “collapses into a rhetorical 
one” (2006b: p. 4). According to Biro and Siegel, the pragma-
dialectical appeals to rationality, norms and reasonableness make it 
look like as if the theory offers a normative and even epistemic 
conception of argumentation, but its “pragmatic character runs 
counter to its apparent normativity” (1992: p. 90). The pragma-
dialectical theory is pictured as wavering between dialectical de-
scriptivism and epistemic normativity, with an unhappy inclination 
to the first. 
 According to Biro and Siegel, “dissatisfaction with a formal 
conception of fallacy has led argumentation scholars, and pragma-
dialecticians among them, to look for pragmatic considerations of 
success or effectiveness, most often in terms of belief change on 
the part of the argument’s audience” (Biro & Siegel 1992: p. 87). 
They claim that it is tempting to see convincing one’s audience as 
the goal that is essential to argument or argumentation (1992: p. 
87). In such an approach the sole requirement, they claim, is causal 
efficacy, for example: is the argument efficacious in realizing a 
resolution in favor of either the antagonist or the protagonist, or is 
it not? But, so they contend, “There is no requirement that the 
change of belief be rational” (1992, p. 87). In Biro and Siegel’s 
view, a rational change of belief, however, would require “a partic-
ular logical or epistemological relation between the argument and 
the change it causes” (1992, p. 87). 
 What is more, since the same argument can happen to succeed 
with one audience and fail with another, a “descriptive” approach 
such as the pragma-dialectical theory, leads to relativism. Fixing 
this problem by idealizing the theory will not work for persistent 
dialecticians. Either the norms or requirements that are added ap-
peal, again, to the actual choices of the participants, and in that 
case the result remains descriptive and relativistic, or the added 
norms or requirements are independent of the contingent choices of 
the participants, and in that case the result is genuinely normative 
 but, in fact, epistemic in nature and no longer dialectic, or so Biro 
and Siegel claim. 
 In Biro and Siegel’s view, a crucial problem is that “the partic-
ipants might abide by the code of conduct and resolve their dispute 
but in ways which render that resolution unjustified or irrational” 
(1992: p. 90). This can happen in two ways. First, where the dispu-
tants share and utilize false or unjustified beliefs, second where 
disputants accept to utilize problematic rules of reasoning or infer-
ence or other unacceptable arrangements (1992: p. 91). Biro and 
Siegel provide an example of the first type of problem:  
 
Two disputants are arguing about the upcoming election. 
Both believe that the most handsome candidate (or the 
Black candidate, or the Jewish candidate, etc.) should be 
elected. They disagree, at the outset, about which candi-
date is most handsome and so most worthy of election; but 
after some discussion, during which the rules of the code 
of conduct are honored, the dispute is resolved and the 
participants agree that they should vote for candidate C. 
(1992: p. 90.) 
 
Biro and Siegel point out that the outcome of the discussion is pa-
tently irrational, since the participants’ shared belief that hand-
someness is an appropriate criterion is itself unjustified. In this case 
a resolution has been reached in accordance with the pragma-
dialectical code of conduct but this result of the discussion is “nev-
ertheless unjustified or irrational” (1992: p. 90). This makes them 
conclude that pragma-dialectical rationality or reasonableness is 
not the kind of reasonableness we are after.  
 In the so-called opening stage of a critical discussion, the dis-
cussants are, indeed, free to draw up a list of propositions as being 
accepted by both parties. These ‘material starting points’ may not 
be called into question during the discussion and only the proposi-
tions that are on this list may be used in the argumentation without 
further justification. This means that when there is an intersubjec-
tive agreement on the acceptability of a premise (starting point), 
discussants can use this starting point as a premise in the argumen-
tation without further justification.
3
 In the election example, the 
discussants agreed on the acceptability of the premise “the most 
handsome candidate is the best candidate” and therefore the use of 
this starting point does not go against the pragma-dialectical 
norms. Biro and Siegel’s argument is that argumentation theories 
                                                 
3
 In specific contexts there may be special constraints that limit the choice of 
starting points. For example, we can choose to resolve an issue merely by re-
source to observational accounts, or to a priori considerations, or to legally ob-
tained evidence, etcetera.  
 that allow absurd assumptions cannot be normative or at least not 
fully normative, and are at least partly descriptive and relativistic. 
Apparently, a really “normative” argumentation theory should pro-
vide provisions that stop discussants from agreeing on principles 
that can be called absurd. 
 The conclusion that the pragma-dialectical approach is, in the 
end, descriptive and relativistic is not justified. The outcome of a 
critical discussion is not an absolute result, but it is partly depend-
ent on the chosen material starting points accepted as not being in 
need of support or criticism. There is a good reason for choosing to 
conceive of argumentation as being potentially non-fallacious even 
in case the argumentation is based upon starting points that we, as 
onlookers or analysts, consider unacceptable. It is in situations 
where we lack generally agreed upon criteria with which to decide 
upon the truth or falsity of propositions, that argumentation is per-
tinent. We want to be able to evaluate arguments in situations 
where matters are contentious or uncertain and where we cannot be 
sure that our preferred criteria for what is true or otherwise worthy 
of our commitment are correct. 
 We leave it up to the various disciplines to provide methods 
and criteria that help scholars to assess the acceptability of premis-
es, and we leave it up to individual disputants to create what they 
conceive of as an appropriate common ground. But we assign ar-
gumentation theory the task of examining how to converse reason-
ably on the basis of whatever is deemed acceptable by parties. At 
any rate, this does not make the pragma-dialectical theory of argu-
mentation descriptive or relativistic. The freedom to adopt material 
starting points is regulated by the general norms for critical discus-
sion, and only making these general norms dependent upon audi-
ences, rather than making the material starting points dependent 
upon audiences, would make a theory genuinely relativistic and 
that is clearly not what happens in the pragma-dialectical approach. 
So, we consider it argumentatively acceptable for two voters to 
commence from the idea that their dispute is to be resolved by de-
ciding on which candidate is most handsome. Absurd as the case 
may be, argumentation theorists should not, a priori, rule out the 
possibility that this point of departure is correct. (Possibly, hand-
someness turns out to be indicative of political strength.) The 
norms for critical discussion are universal in the sense that they 
constitute the ideal of critical discussion that is applicable to argu-
mentation in all settings. 
 The second type of problem Biro and Siegel mention arises 
where the arguers reach an unjustified outcome because they use 
incorrect reasoning schemes or inference rules, such as schemes 
enabling the discussants to agree on outcomes that, as a matter of 
fact, are the result of the gambler’s fallacy (1992: p. 91). Even 
though the model for critical discussion allows the parties some 
 latitude when deciding upon logical issues in the opening stage, 
there is a general requirement according to which the adopted logi-
cal schemes or argument schemes possess so-called ‘problem va-
lidity.’ The notion of problem validity (Barth & Krabbe 1982) is 
used by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: pp. 22, 134) to refer 
to discussion rules that are instrumental for resolving differences of 
opinion, including rules that concern the logical or argumentative 
relations between propositions. If arguers start from logical 
schemes or argument schemes that lack problem validity, the result 
of the discussion is at most a pseudo-resolution. 
 That a (logical or argumentation) scheme is problem valid we 
take to mean that the adoption of the scheme
4
 is instrumental for 
the resolution of the dispute. We restrict attention to argumentation 
schemes although something similar can be said for logical 
schemes (see Barth & Krabbe 1982). For example, the pragmatic 
argumentation scheme provides the protagonist of a standpoint to 
the effect that a certain action ought to be carried out, with a prem-
ise that points out that carrying out the action has particular conse-
quences and a premise that points out that these consequences are 
preferable to the consequences of refraining from that action. An 
argumentation scheme is associated with a set of critical question 
with which these reasons, and their justificatory force for the 
standpoint at hand, can be tested by the antagonist. One type of 
critical question connected with the pragmatic scheme concerns 
whether the consequences of the proposed action are preferable, as 
alleged by the protagonist. 
 Adopting the scheme is problem valid insofar as the scheme 
enables the parties to offer arguments that promote criticisms in 
line with points of departure adopted by the parties. The pragmatic 
scheme has a clear structure, and a clear set of critical question 
with which to test it, thereby satisfying a general requirement for 
argument schemes. Moreover, if the protagonist and the antagonist 
share the point of departure that practical issues are to be decided 
by weighing the actions’ consequences, the scheme leads the par-
ticipants to take the pertinent considerations into account. (For par-
ties who choose to resolve practical issues only by deontic 
measures, the pragmatic scheme could possibly lack problem valid-
ity.) So, the scheme is problem valid, not because it is an objective 
fact that practical issues can be decided by weighing the utilities of 
the options for action and because applying the scheme leads the 
parties to the best possible outcome, but because the scheme helps 
the participants to critically assess proposals for action from their 
consequentialist stance. It helps them to weed out errors regarding 
the assignment of consequences to actions and of values to conse-
                                                 
4
 More precisely: the adoption of the rule according to which employing that 
scheme is admissible. 
 quences. Note that this explication of problem validity does not 
employ the terminology of seeking for justifying reasons, but is 
formulated entirely in terms of critical testing, a characteristic of 
the pragma-dialectical approach that will be dealt with further in 
Section 3. 
 Therefore, the use of argumentation or logical schemes is, un-
like the choice for material starting points, not a matter of mere 
agreement between participants, although for a resolution this 
agreement is a necessary condition, but a scheme has as an addi-
tional requirement that it furthers critical testing. The problem va-
lidity of the discussion rules in general, and of the appropriateness 
of the argumentation and reasoning schemes in particular, is the 
result of assessing them, not in view of their epistemic worth, but 
rather in view of the degree to which they promote criticism, some-
thing insufficiently appreciated by Biro and Siegel, in our opinion. 
 By the way, from the (in our eyes unjustified) conclusion that, 
in pragma-dialectics, what counts as reasonable depends on the 
accidental participants in the discussion, Biro and Siegel conclude 
that we need an epistemic approach to argumentation if we want a 
normative account of argumentation. The epistemic alternative is 
based “on the claim that is a conceptual truth about arguments that 
their central (not, of course, only) purpose is to provide a bridge 
from known truths or justified beliefs to as yet unknown (or at least 
unrecognized) truths or as yet unjustified beliefs” (1992: p. 92). 
What is striking about this view is that it seems to imply an unac-
ceptable restriction of the type of issues that can be raised in dis-
cussion. Political or legal argumentation that is put forward in de-
fense of practical standpoints seems to be disregarded. For it is 
only in a stretched use of the term that we can say that it is true that 
something ought to be done or that the prudence of an action is the 
object of a belief.
5
 What is more, from a dialectical stance, the no-
tions “known truth” and “justified belief” need further clarification. 
Who is to decide that a certain statement is a “known truth” or a 
“justified belief,” in case the matter is contentious? We will come 
back to this issue when dealing, in the next section, with Biro and 










                                                 
5
 Freeman’s epistemological argumentation theory (2005) fares better in this 
respect, because he considers ‘acceptability’ as the central notion when evaluat-
ing premises. 
  
3. The rejection of justificationism in the pragma-dialectical 
approach 
 
Biro and Siegel’s second objection to the pragma-dialectical ap-
proach concerns van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s rejection of jus-
tificationism as a philosophical point of departure of argumentation 
theory, as this can be found for example in A Systematic Theory of 
Argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: p. 131). Justi-
ficationism, according to Albert, amounts to the adoption of the 
following principle: “always seek an adequate foundation—a suffi-
cient justification—for all your convictions” (1985: p. 14). In the 
view of justificationists, arguments are vital as the means for gen-
erating the justifications that are needed to conform to this princi-
ple. A good argument can, in this light, be seen as an argument that 
provides a sufficient justification for some conviction. In Bartley’s 
words, justificationism can be characterized as the kind of philoso-
phy that is concerned with providing the criteria for answering 
questions of the kind “How do you know?” (Bartley: 1984, p. 113) 
 Instead of justificationism, van Eemeren and Grootendorst opt 
for critical rationalism as the appropriate, non-justificatory philo-
sophical point of departure for studying argumentation. Bartley 
called his alternative to justificationism ‘pancritical rationalism’ 
and he presented it as an enhanced version of Popper’s critical ra-
tionalism. Pancritical rationalism is the kind of philosophy that has 
as its central question:  
 
How can our intellectual life and institutions be arranged 
so as to expose our beliefs, conjectures, policies, posi-
tions, sources of ideas, traditions, and the like—whether 
or not they are justifiable—to maximum criticism, in order 
to counteract and eliminate as much intellectual error as 
possible? (Bartley: 1984, p. 113.)  
 
The model for critical discussion that van Eemeren and Grooten-
dorst developed can be understood as their proposal for an ar-
rangement that promotes criticism, in a way indicated by Bartley. 
Dialectic, as we conceive of it, is the study of conversational norms 
that promote criticism. 
 Biro and Siegel’s objection against the rejection of justifica-
tionism is twofold, and we will deal with these objections in more 
detail in the sections below. First, they hold that it is not possible to 
reject justificationism and, at the same time, to accept arguments as 
potentially sound. By rejecting justificationism, the pragma-
dialectical theory undermines its own position. 
 
 To reject ‘justificationism’ in the sense of positive justifi-
cation would be devastating to their [van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst’s] project in at least two ways: it would un-
dercut the possibility of any argument(ation) succeeding 
in the sense of providing interlocutors with good reasons 
to accept or reject any given standpoint at issue; and it 
would undercut their own many impressive efforts to de-
fend the pragma-dialectical view they champion. (Siegel 
& Biro: 2008, p. 199.) 
 
Moreover, Biro and Siegel suggest that there is a ‘whiff’ of justifi-
cationism in the pragma-dialectical theory by pointing out that 
Popper himself had to concede there to be a ‘whiff of inductivism’ 
in his critical rationalist philosophy of science. 
 Second, Biro and Siegel believe that the rejection of justifica-
tionism rests on a mistake. According to pragma-dialectics, a justi-
ficationist is forced to choose from three evils, represented in the 
so-called ‘Münchhausen trilemma’. We will elaborate on this in the 
next section. However, Biro and Siegel take it that the pragma-
dialectical theory overlooks a fourth option: “we think MT [the 
Münchhausen trilemma] can be readily overcome” (2008: p. 199). 
Put differently, there is a way out of the trilemma. 
 In Section 3.1, we discuss the Münchhausen trilemma in order 
to determine what the rejection of justificationism amounts to. We 
show in Section 3.2 how in the pragma-dialectical theory on the 
one side justificationism is being rejected and on the other there is 
talk of ‘pro-argumentation’ and ‘justificatory force’, in what we 
consider a consistent manner. Here we shall also try to show that 
there is not even a whiff of justificationism in pragma-dialectics. 
This provides us with our answer to the challenges concerning the 
consistency of the pragma-dialectical program. Finally, we will 
show in Section 3.3 how the supposed fourth escape route is not 
really a way out but in fact a turn to a dialectical starting point.  
 
3.1 The Münchhausen trilemma 
 
The pragma-dialecticians have rejected justificationism by refer-
ence to the Münchhausen trilemma. We will explain what this tri-
lemma amounts to and point at two shortcomings that, in our view, 
lie at the bottom of the failure of justificationism. 
 Following Albert, van Eemeren and Grootendorst explain that 
each version of justificationism falls victim to one of the three 
horns of the Münchhausen trilemma (1988: p. 279). Baron 
Münchhausen boasted that he had pulled himself up from a swamp 
by his own hair, and his horse with him. The justificationist princi-
ple is considered as impossible to follow as the imaginary accom-
 plishment of the baron. This forms a reason to choose for an alter-
native philosophical point of departure. 
 According to the trilemma, a justificationist is forced to choose 
from three evils. The first option is to accept that each justifying 
reason must be supported itself with further reasons. The ultimate 
consequence of this choice would be an infinite regress of support-
ing reasons being supported by reasons, for how could a justifica-
tionist turn down his own requests for further support? The second 
option is to state, at some point or other, that a supporting argu-
mentation is plausible to such a level that it carries its own support. 
One might suppose that some assertions are incorrigible, for exam-
ple because they express fully accurately what one has perceived, 
or because they cannot be denied, or even challenged, in a con-
sistent way. In such cases, one, in effect, abandons the justifica-
tionist’s principle and succumbs to what Albert refers to as a dog-
ma. The third option is to support a supporting reason by the prop-
osition that this reason is supposed to support. Such circular rea-
soning enables one to create a situation where all propositions get 
some support, but the result does not contain a genuinely justified 
conclusion. The upshot of the Münchhausen critique is that the 
adoption of justificationism leads one into insurmountable prob-
lems. 
 In our view, the trilemma provides a sketch of the types of 
problems that must be dealt with when adopting the justificationist 
principle. The dismissal of justificationism can further be argued 
for by pointing at the fallibility of our convictions and theories. 
(Below it will become clear in what non-justificationist sense we 
understand our own arguing). We could be wrong, also with our 
most cherished opinions and most obvious assumptions. It is espe-
cially useful to take fallibilism as seriously as possible when it 
comes to controversial topics. Even if the quest for justification can 
be reconciled with the acknowledgement that humans are fallible, 
critical rationalism constitutes an approach that takes the fallibility 
of our cognitive capacities more seriously than justificationism. For 
the central idea in the critical approach is that opinions and theories 
must be tested systematically and critically, and that sound argu-
ments should be understood as contributions to such a critical ex-
amination. Merely acknowledging the possibility of shortcomings 
in a justification does not suffice. That is why argumentation 
should be situated in the kind of discussion where an antagonist has 
adopted the task of finding out whether the protagonist’s standpoint 
is acceptable, and whether the argumentation offered in support of 
the standpoint is sound. A weakness of justificationism is therefore 
that the attention is fixed on justification rather than on criticism.
6
 
                                                 
6
 We appreciate Freeman’s detailed epistemological account of premise accepta-
bility for incorporating defeaters, which makes his theory explicitly fallibilist. In 
  A second, though related, weakness is that justificationists do 
not pay sufficient attention to the addressee, and his points of de-
parture. According to the pragma-dialectical approach, an attempt 
at justification can only be said to be successful, given a collection 
of propositions that function as the material starting points and a 
set of norms, in addition to the norms for critical discussion, that 
function as the procedural starting points (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 2004: p. 143). The material and procedural commit-
ments that the participants in a critical discussion adopt can be seen 
as the frame in which they are examining the acceptability of the 
standpoint. Both types of starting points can themselves be chosen 
as a topic for discussion (either in a subdiscussion or in a separate 
discussion) and are, consequently, not immune to criticism. In-
stead, in justificationism, as Biro and Siegel seem to conceive it, it 
is assumed that the quality of argumentation is not to be judged by 
determining whether it is based on what an antagonist happens to 
be willing to commit himself to, but, at least in the ideal case, by 
determining whether the argumentation satisfies the objective crite-
ria (true starting points and the truly reliable argument and reason-
ing schemes). The choice for taking fallibility as seriously as pos-
sible incites us to adopt the first stance. Each proposal for accept-
ing would-be objective argumentative criteria must be considered 
as disputable, if not here and now then on different occasions, and 
consequently as a position within a discussion. (The pragma-
dialectical proposal for a collection of rules for critical discussion 
itself is a position in discussions about argumentative reasonable-
ness.) 
 The pragma-dialectical criticism against justificationism is not 
that it would be impossible to bring forward good reasons in sup-
port of a standpoint. The criticism is that the focus is on good rea-
sons, conceived of as in a socially void space, instead of argumen-
tation as a response to criticisms by a particular antagonist. We will 




                                                                                                              
his view, a premise is ‘acceptable just when there is a presumption in its favor’ 
(2005: p. 21). The notion of presumption of a statement is, following Plantinga, 
in part explicated in terms of the presumptions pertaining to the mechanisms 
which have generated the belief at hand (and in part by a pragmatic criterion). 
Absent defeaters, beliefs that are generated by reliable mechanisms that are 
designed for generating truths and that function properly within suitable circum-
stances, are considered acceptable. However, what makes a critical rationalist 
perspective more fallibilist is that it focuses on publicly testable statements and 
that it leaves it open for a party to even challenge statements that correctly ex-
press beliefs generated by the mechanisms just sketched. An antagonist might do 
so for skeptical reasons, or when he is motivated by judicial considerations, for 
example. 
  
3.2 Is the pragma-dialectical theory a disguised form of justifica-
tionism?  
 
Biro and Siegel’s opinion is that there is no room for a notion of 
positive argumentation or justification in the pragma-dialectical 
approach, if it is to be genuinely critical rationalist. They support 
this view by referring to remarks about arguments by the critical 
rationalist philosophers Popper and Miller. First, we will make it 
clear that Biro and Siegel are correct in interpreting pragma-
dialectics as rejecting justification as the proper aim of arguments, 
rather than merely rejecting justification with certainty.
7
 Still, ‘ar-
gument’, ‘pro-argumentation’, ‘justificatory force,’ and related 
expressions, have in pragma-dialectics been provided with a non-
justificationist meaning, as we will show. Finally, we will invali-
date the suggestion that there is a whiff of justificationism in the 
pragma-dialectical approach. 
 Biro and Siegel distinguish between a weak and a strong form 
of justificationism (2008, p. 197). According to the strong version, 
we ought to strive for theories or standpoints that are certainly true; 
according to weak justificationism, which they themselves defend, 
we ought to strive for justification, whether this pursuit is accom-
panied by a quest for certainty or whether one is satisfied with jus-
tifications that are inductively strong or considered adequate in 
different ways. Does the pragma-dialectical theory only reject the 
strong version, or also the weak one? 
 Biro and Siegel correctly point out that critical rationalism 
extends beyond the mere rejection of the quest for certainty. Pop-
per and Miller explicitly opposed an inductivist or probabilistic 
elaboration of justificationism. Also in Albert’s reading, justifica-
tionism includes non-deductivist variants. Biro and Siegel are 
therefore correct in characterizing critical rationalism as the rejec-
tion of even the weaker form of justificationism (Biro & Siegel 
2008: pp. 195-197; 201-202) and in interpreting the Münchhausen 
argumentation as targeting each form of justificationism. Also 
pragma-dialectics can be seen as starting from a rejection of weak 
justificationism. 
 However, different from what Biro and Siegel hold (and, ap-
parently, Lumer with them, 2009, n. 10), there is room for a notion 
of positive argumentation within the pragma-dialectical develop-
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 Their arguments for this interpretation are that only this interpretation makes it 
possible to explain why van Eemeren and Grootendorst invoke the Münchhausen 
trilemma and why they call themselves ‘critical rationalists’. Moreover, if van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst would merely reject strong justifications, their phi-
losophy would have been epistemic in nature, which runs counter to the dialecti-
cal criteria of reasonableness defended by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2008: 
p. 202). 
 ment of critical rationalism. The use of expressions such as ‘argu-
ment’, ‘pro-argumentation’, and ‘justificatory force’, does not 
show a hidden commitment to (the weak form of) justificationism. 
First, we will show that even the critical rationalist Miller, referred 
to by Biro and Siegel when arguing that critical rationalists do and 
should reject all arguments, allows room for a particular notion of 
argument. Second, we will deal with the pragma-dialectical per-
spective itself and show that these terms have been provided with 
meanings that cohere with the critical rationalist outlook of the 
theory. 
 Miller defends the thesis that argumentation should only fulfill 
a critical function. He has a narrow view
8
 on what counts as criti-
cal: with a “critical argument” one tries to deduce a false conse-
quence from an hypothesis (  and ), thereby proving the 
falsity of hypothesis ( ). In addition, Miller allows for a special 
type of critical argumentation he characterizes as “defensive argu-
ment,” which is a critical argument aimed at refuting another criti-
cal argument. A defensive argument reasons towards either the 
denial of the statement that expresses that the hypothesis’ conse-
quence is false (so an argument with  as its conclusion) or to 
the denial of the statement that expresses that the hypothesis leads 
to the consequence (so an argument with ( ) as its conclu-
sion). An exchange of such “critical” and “defensive” arguments 
does not suffer from the defects of justificationism, according to 
Miller. The main defect of justificationist thinking is that, in so far 
as a justification is logically valid (and Miller takes validity to be a 
necessary condition for reasoning), the supporting argumentation 
must contain all information that is expressed in the conclusion. 
Due to this inevitable “circularity,” a chain of justifications keeps 
revolving around the same bits of information. Instead of stimulat-
ing an exploring attitude in order to find errors and mistakes, justi-
ficatory thinking entrenches oneself deeper and deeper. The dialec-
tic of “critical argument” and “defensive argument,” however, in-
cites the participants to search for new information with which to 
refute the other side and decide the dispute. The examination is 
critical and directed towards fresh data (Miller 1994: pp. 66–69; 
Miller 2006: p. 76–79). So, even on Miller’s account, there is room 
for argumentation. In the pragma-dialectical theory, arguments are 
assessed from a perspective that resembles the critical spirit of Mil-
ler but that starts from a more inclusive notion of criticism. 
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 In our view Miller expresses an overly negative stance towards positive argu-
mentation, suggesting that each form of support or attempt at persuasion is sus-
picious and never functional to critical examination (Miller 2006, Chapter 3). 
This negative view stems from an all too narrow view of criticism. As will be-
come clear, we take it that positive arguments are sometimes functional from a 
critical perspective. 
  According to the pragma-dialectical theory, argumentation 
must be examined from the perspective of a critical discussion. 
Within a critical discussion, the range of critical devices at the dis-
posal of the participants extends beyond deducing the denial of a 
standpoint, deducing the denial of the denial of a logical conse-
quence of the standpoint or deducing the denial of the connection 
between standpoint and the would-be consequence. In a critical 
discussion, the position of the protagonist is to be tested: (1) by 
posing a critical question, either directed at the standpoint or at a 
supporting reason or at the chosen argumentation or logical 
scheme; (2) by requesting linguistic clarification from the protago-
nist; (3) by offering argumentation for either the denial of the 
standpoint or the denial of a supporting reason; and (4) by chal-
lenging the legitimacy of the argumentation, for example by way of 
a fallacy charge. Consequently, there is a larger inventory of moves 
that can have a useful role in a critical examination of the accepta-
bility of a standpoint. The similarity with Miller’s view is that ar-
gumentation is situated in a critical, dialectical kind of encounter. 
 Due to this dialectical setting, the argumentative terminology 
has been provided with content that is not justificationist in charac-
ter. First, the protagonist puts forward argumentation in response to 
challenges by the antagonist. It is the antagonist who, by posing 
critical questions, objections and requests for clarification, points at 
the components of the protagonist’s position that are considered in 
need of further support or clarification. In short, argumentation, in 
the dialectical sense of the term, is not an attempt to find a more or 
less firm foundation, but nothing more nor less than coping with 
criticism. 
 Second, argumentation is part of a cooperative examination 
into the issue of whether the standpoint of the protagonist is to be 
accepted by the antagonist, given the starting points that the parties 
have agreed upon in the opening stage. Even though there is noth-
ing to defend for the antagonist in a non-mixed discussion and 
there is not a kind of burden of proof for his critical stance, the 
antagonist does have an argumentative position. In the argumenta-
tion stage, it is up to the antagonist to maintain and elaborate his 
critical position in a consistent manner in spite of the argumenta-
tion put forward by the protagonist. Consequently, the argumenta-
tion of the protagonist contains a critical aspect, in so far as it 
forms a test of the feasibility of this aspiration of the antagonist in 
the argumentation stage. Like Miller, we say that all good argu-
ments are “critical” and aimed at testing the critical position of the 
antagonist. In short, argumentation forms a part of a mutual inves-
tigation into the acceptability of a standpoint, and therefore into the 
tenability of both the position of the protagonist and of the antago-
nist. Different from what Biro and Siegel seem to suppose (2008), 
critical rationalistic argumentation theorists do not need to avoid all 
 uses of terms such as ‘argument’, ‘pro-argumentation’ and ‘justifi-
catory force’. 
 Of course, justificationists also assign a role to criticism by 
stressing the importance of the question “how do you know that 
P?” when P has been offered as a thesis or as part of a justification. 
Bartley distinguishes between “justificational philosophies of criti-
cism” (1984, p. 116), where criticism is considered the same as a 
demand for justification, and nonjustificational philosophy of criti-
cism (p. 117), where criticism is aimed at eliminating errors and 
not at positive justification. It is clear that in our understanding, 
“criticism” aimed at weeding out errors is primary and that argu-
ment is better seen as a by-product of the critical process than as 
the device with which to guarantee a position in a secure enough 
foundation.  
 This dialectical explication of ‘argumentation’ also provides 
the main ingredient of our response to Biro and Siegel’s criticism 
according to which critical rationalism is in need of a notion of 
justification (2008: pp. 197-8). Biro and Siegel remind us of Pop-
per’s acknowledgement that his critical rationalism does not re-
main fully free from inductivism (and thereby from justification-
ism), namely in so far as Popper had to concede that a scientific 
theory or hypothesis that has withstood serious attempts at refuta-
tion, and has thus been “corroborated,” can be seen as having more 
“truthlikeness” as compared to less successful theories (Newton-
Smith 1981, p. 67-8). There is thus a “whiff of inductivism” in 
Popper’s position. Biro and Siegel seem to suggest that a similar 
concession to justificationism should be appropriate for pragma-
dialectics. Even though the authors do not spell out the (parallel) 
argument that should force pragma-dialecticians to make this (par-
allel) concession, in our interpretation it must be something along 
the following lines. Presumably, the pragma-dialectical problem 
would be that it must accept a special kind of justification as ac-
ceptable, contrary to its critical aspirations. For, suppose that a crit-
ical discussion results in a resolution in favor of a protagonist who 
has defended a standpoint S (the analogue of a corroborated hy-
pothesis). Then pragma-dialecticians would have to accept that this 
outcome of the discussion constitutes a justification of standpoint 
S’s acceptability (the analogue of an hypothesis that can be consid-
ered as having an increased “truthlikeness”). What is more, given 
that it is our interest in acceptable standpoints that motivates us to 
resolve differences of opinion, pragma-dialectics generates such 
special kinds of justifications in its quest for acceptable stand-
points. However, we do not think this problem arises. 
 First, in a dialectical sense of ‘justify’, the outcome of a dis-
cussion can, indeed, (but need not) be used to justify a proposition. 
This is not indicative of a whiff of justificationism. Suppose, two 
discussions, D and D’, have been conducted, such that the protago-
 nist in D defends that S while the protagonist in D’ defends that 
not-S. Suppose further that both discussions proceed from starting 
points that some person P underwrites, that all propositions that P 
considers relevant for this issue are in fact starting points of D and 
D’, that the parties in D and D’ have performed the moves that P 
would consider the pertinent moves, and that D and D’ do not con-
tain any violation of a rule for critical discussion. Finally suppose 
that S has been defended successfully in D but that not-S has not 
been defended successfully in D’ (or that S has been defended 
more successfully in D as compared to how not-S has fared in D’). 
Then, other things being equal, it can be expected that this person P 
will prefer S as his personal conviction over not-S. A person, Q, 
could even try to convince P of S by referring to these discussions 
D and D’ and their outcomes. That way of arguing could be a suc-
cess for Q. 
 The fact that this kind of argumentation can be in line with the 
norms for critical discussion, however, does not mean that the 
pragma-dialectical approach allows for a “whiff of justification-
ism”. Every argument can be understood as part of a mutual, criti-
cal examination, and this special argument (that takes the outcome 
of D and D’ as its starting points), too, should be seen as a response 
to an antagonist (P) who is testing the standpoint critically. So, the 
special argument does not constitute justification, unless we under-
stand this term in a dialectical fashion. 
 Second, the parties’ interest in resolving differences of opinion 
is not necessarily motivated by the aim of arriving at true or ac-
ceptable standpoints. We readily agree that critical discussions can 
be instrumental for dialogue participants who are primarily inter-
ested in finding out whether the standpoint at issue is acceptable 
“as such” (i.e., expressing a true proposition, or an action that is 
really recommendable, or an evaluation that is genuinely appropri-
ate), rather than merely defensible against a particular antagonist 
with particular starting points. But this aim for a standpoint that is 
“as such” acceptable is not the goal of critical discussion as defined 
in pragma-dialectics. The desired result of any critical discussion is 
either that the standpoint has been successfully defended against an 
antagonist who has been committed himself to a particular set of 
starting points, or that the standpoint has been successfully criti-
cized from that particular stance. So, different from Popper’s phi-
losophy of science, which is motivated by the quest for true theo-
ries, the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation remains re-
stricted to the investigation of standpoints in the light of particular 
sets of starting points. Given that the pragma-dialectical theory is 
about defending standpoints against an addressee with a particular 
set of commitments, rather than about trying to approach true theo-
ries or standpoints that are acceptable as such¸ there is not even a 
whiff of justificationism in pragma-dialectics. In short, argumenta-
 tion must be understood from the intended, critical perspective and 
the argumentative expressions used do not imply any concession to 
justificationism, other than that expressions such as ‘justificatory 
force’ are useful ones.  
 
3.3 The way out of the dilemma 
 
According to Biro and Siegel, the justificationist has a fourth op-
tion when facing the Münchhausen problem, and one that does not 
have the drawbacks of the other three. So, it is not really a trilem-
ma, and there is no need to give up justificationism. We will make 
it plausible that the escape route that Biro and Siegel construct is 
only enabled by introducing a dialectical, non-justificationist con-
sideration. Put differently, we do not think this escape route is 
available to justificationists.  
 The authors illustrate their fourth way with an example. A 
proposition q, “Cheney lobbied Senators to defeat the McCain 
amendment prohibiting torture,” is supported with a proposition r, 
“Cheney admitted his lobbying efforts and resigned”. Of course, so 
they say, this reason itself can also be criticized, and in such a case 
a link is to be added to the chain of justifications. But, “absent 
some such further challenge [...] r is justified” (2008, p. 200). Ab-
sent such a challenge, proposition r forms a non-arbitrary and non-
circular endpoint. 
 We agree that the situation could be such that r is not in need 
of argumentation, namely, to be specific, if the antagonist has 
committed himself to r as a starting point, or if the antagonist, as a 
matter of fact, does not challenge r. But to our mind, a motivation 
of this kind only succeeds when having adopted a dialectical back-
ground. From a dialectical stance it is clear where the protagonist 
can stop putting forward further arguments: when having arrived at 
the mutually agreed upon starting points of the discussion. From a 
justificationist stance, where no clear role is assigned to a critical 
antagonist, it cannot be made clear that r does not stand in need of 
support. Because, a justificationist response to Biro and Siegel’s 
proposed solution could go: “What does it matter whether or not r 
happens to be addressed to an audience that, as a matter of fact, 
does not challenge r? The real issue is the objective truth and since 
r’s truth has not yet been guaranteed, we ought to justify r”. So, we 
fail to see a fourth way that is genuinely justificationist.
9
 
                                                 
9
 Biro and Siegel point out the similarity between the resolution of the trilemma 
they propose and Popper’s emphasis on basic statements (2008, p. 200). Given 
the structural similarity between Popper’s basic statements in his philosophy of 
science and the accepted starting points in the model of a critical discussion, we 
regard this as being in line with our contention that a dialectical element lies at 





Biro and Siegel have raised two objections against the pragma-
dialectical theory of argumentation. According to the first, the the-
ory is not genuinely normative. According to the second, the prag-
ma-dialectical rejection of justificationism is unwarranted. The first 
objection is based on what we regard as the misconception that 
resolution is not a normative notion. As far as the second kind of 
objection is concerned, the authors do not seem to acknowledge 
that the notion of argument, and related notions, have been defined 
in a non-justificatory manner and that the alleged escape route 
from the Münchhausen trilemma is only possible after having in-
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